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Since the early 2000s, Indian strategists have wrestled with the challenge of 
motivating Pakistan to demobilize anti-India terrorist groups while managing 
the potential for conflict escalation during a crisis. The growing prominence 
of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national security strategy casts a shadow of 
nuclear use over any potential military strategy India might consider to strike 
this balance. However, augmenting its nuclear options with tactical nuclear 
weapons is unlikely to bolster Indian deterrence in convincing ways.
Deterrence and Escalation in South Asia
• India continues to develop offensive conventional military options to respond 
to future terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan, but these options do not 
mesh well with India’s restrained nuclear doctrine and arsenal. 
• Pakistan’s adoption of tactical nuclear weapons lowers the threshold for 
nuclear use, further complicating India’s conventional and nuclear options 
to deter and, if conflict cannot be avoided, defeat its neighbor.
• Some Indian and American strategists advocate India’s development of 
tactical nuclear weapons to counter Pakistan’s. This could give India suf-
ficient perceived advantage in an escalating conflict to motivate Pakistan 
to stop cross-border terrorism.
• The prospect of employing limited nuclear options raises unresolvable 
questions about whether nuclear war can be limited and about India’s 
capabilities to acquire and manage forces to prosecute limited nuclear war.
Implications for Indian Strategy
India’s existing and projected nuclear capabilities are sufficient to deter 
Pakistan from starting a conventional war. The risk of war arises primarily 
from terrorism emanating from Pakistan. If India does not intend to put mili-
tary boots on Pakistani soil in response to a terrorist attack, which could trig-
ger Pakistani nuclear use, then India has no need for tactical nuclear weapons. 
India’s current nuclear capabilities do not give it credible options for lim-
ited use. India would need significant investments in military hardware, soft-
ware, and an array of enabling capabilities to make employment of limited 
nuclear options feasible and credible.
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Indian tactical nuclear weapons are unlikely to motivate Pakistan to 
demobilize groups that attack India. There is little basis for confidence that 
additional nuclear capability can resolve this challenge. 
Indian tactical nuclear weapons may increase the likelihood that a future 
conflict on Pakistani territory will go nuclear. Use-or-lose pressures on 
Pakistani military commanders would grow if India acquired these weapons, 
making unintended escalation likelier.
If  India opts to develop limited nuclear options, policymakers should refrain 
from announcing a capability before it exists. There is a tendency in India to 
announce or publicly discuss operational concepts or weapons systems before 
they exist. Doing so would prompt Pakistan to develop new countermeasures.
3Introduction
Would changes in India’s nuclear doctrine, force posture, or capabilities 
enhance its deterrence of threats from Pakistan? Without a more flexible nuclear 
capability and doctrine to better manage escalation risks, can India’s efforts to 
deter cross-border terrorism and other hostile acts with punitive conventional 
military options be effective? Should India develop tactical-nuclear-weapon 
capabilities and an associated limited-nuclear-options strategy to counter those 
of Pakistan? 
Since the early 2000s, Indian strategists have wrestled with these questions 
in addressing the challenges of motivating Pakistan to demobilize anti-India 
terrorist groups and, relatedly, managing the potential for conflict escalation 
during a crisis. The shadow of nuclear use hangs over any 
potential military strategy India might consider—whether 
limited conventional ground options, precision airstrikes, 
or covert operations. While using nuclear weapons is an 
option of last recourse, the growing prominence of nuclear 
weapons in Pakistan’s national security strategy suggests 
an increased probability of nuclear use earlier in a conflict. 
Although Pakistan and some other countries with nuclear 
weapons (such as the United States) maintain first-use 
nuclear policies, it is generally understood that a surprise disarming first strike 
is highly improbable, including in South Asia. Instead, use of nuclear weapons 
is more likely to result from escalation of conventional conflict, inadvertent 
targeting of nuclear weapons, or accidental or unauthorized launch. 
But in South Asia, questions about the unitariness of the Pakistani state 
and its association with groups that have conducted attacks in India create a 
unique circumstance—the linkage between subconventional aggression ema-
nating from Pakistan and Pakistan’s stated threat of nuclear escalation to deter 
Indian responses—not well explored in classic deterrence theory.1 Simply put, 
Western deterrence theorists never contemplated a nuclear-armed adversary 
that tolerated or employed subconventional violence by proxy on the adver-
sary’s homeland. Indian and Pakistani nuclear planners are charting new terri-
tory. As the late Indian strategic thinker K. Subrahmanyam observed, “There 
is not much, if any at all, literature on the game of deterrence among the sec-
ond- and third-rung nuclear nations under such conditions of uncertainty. So 
we have to think for ourselves.”2 
India, with its commitment to no first use of nuclear weapons, has not uti-
lized nuclear weapons to substitute for or complement other forms of force or 
The shadow of nuclear use hangs over any 
potential military strategy India might consider—
whether limited conventional ground options, 
precision airstrikes, or covert operations.
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coercion to motivate desired changes of behavior by Pakistan. Nevertheless, 
rapid improvement in nuclear capabilities by Pakistan and gradual nuclear 
modernization by China have changed India’s national security environment 
in ways that compound deterrence challenges. India has maintained since 
1998 a three-pillar nuclear policy of credible minimum deterrence, no first use, 
and massive retaliation in case India is attacked first with nuclear weapons. 
This approach to nuclear deterrence is, in the words of former Indian foreign 
secretary Shyam Saran, “appropriate to the current geopolitical environment, 
is aligned with [India’s] existing and projected levels of technological capa-
bilities and affordability and most importantly, is reflective of India’s domestic 
realities and its value system.”3 However, some experts and former military 
officials in India, echoed by Western analysts, have begun to question whether 
India should alter its approach to nuclear deterrence to better fit its current and 
future strategic environment.
The aim here is to analyze the implications of an Indian decision to augment 
its nuclear options. Nuclear weapons are not a direct substitute for conven-
tional military capabilities or covert operations. Rather, they can be seen as 
a complement to India’s conventional military instruments in scenarios with 
escalatory potential. Neither Pakistan nor India is likely to conduct bolt-from-
the-blue nuclear attacks on the other, nor will Pakistan risk initiating a major 
conventional war against India. A myriad of national inter-
ests backed by mutual second-strike nuclear deterrence 
render such threats unrealistic in South Asia at the present 
time. The analytical focus is on the role of nuclear weapons 
in an escalating crisis, such as might begin with a major 
terrorist attack on India emanating from Pakistan.4 This 
analysis draws primarily on Indian debates and sources, as 
well as the literature and experiences of sources from out-
side South Asia that may illuminate the dilemmas Indian 
officials and analysts confront. However, no other nuclear-armed competitors 
have faced challenges as complex as those that Indians and Pakistanis now 
face, given the potential role of terrorism as the trigger for escalation up the 
ladder from subconventional to conventional to nuclear conflict. 
Fundamentally, as long as India does not plan to execute an offensive conven-
tional military capability that would result in Indian troops entering Pakistani 
territory, tactical nuclear weapons are unlikely to bolster Indian deterrence in 
convincing ways. On the contrary, introducing tactical nuclear weapons raises 
very difficult questions about whether nuclear war can be kept limited, and 
may even raise risks of military confrontations resulting in nuclear use. India’s 
existing capabilities, along with its planned investments in naval nuclear forces, 
provide it a credible and assured deterrence posture that is sufficient to deter 
Pakistan from starting a major conventional or nuclear war. However, there 
is no basis for confidence that Indian nuclear weapons—whether strategic or 
Introducing tactical nuclear weapons raises very 
difficult questions about whether nuclear war 
can be kept limited, and may even raise risks of 
military confrontations resulting in nuclear use. 
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tactical—can significantly impact Pakistani motivations to demobilize mili-
tant groups that attack India. 
An Evolving Nuclear Landscape
The shadow of nuclear deterrence has loomed over the security landscape in 
South Asia since well before May 1998, when India and Pakistan conducted 
nuclear-weapon test explosions. Scientists and strategists in both countries 
began writing about the atomic bomb in the 1950s in parallel to the develop-
ment of their nuclear science and energy programs.5 Global developments were 
among the factors that drove India to conduct what it termed a “peaceful” 
nuclear test in 19746—in particular India’s defeat in a border conflict with 
China in 1962, China’s first nuclear-weapon test in 1964, and the perceived 
intrusion of the United States and the Soviet Union on India’s autonomy dur-
ing the 1971 war with Pakistan. Despite this test and the resulting denial of 
trade and assistance to India’s nuclear energy program, India’s leaders took 
few steps to weaponize the fissile material it produced. India did not build a 
nuclear arsenal or even seek to exercise nuclear deterrence against its neighbors 
until the mid-1980s.7 Instead, Indian leaders chose to emphasize quite different 
nuclear-related policies, including challenging the discriminatory nature of the 
global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the dangers of arms rac-
ing by the Cold War superpowers, as well as offering proposals to jump-start 
a nuclear disarmament process. The unusually slow pace of nuclear-weapon 
development, coupled with the importance given to disarmament in India’s 
foreign policy, speaks to the Indian elite’s enduring view of nuclear weapons as 
political rather than military tools.8
Pakistan’s nuclear-weapon program, meanwhile, was initiated following the 
ignominious loss of the eastern half of the country in the 1971 war with India.9 
The sense of existential threat and insecurity since the partition of India and 
Pakistan in 1947, compounded by the subsequent bifurcation of Pakistan that 
produced Bangladesh in 1971, clearly helped motivate Pakistan to develop the 
bomb. For Pakistani politicians and military officers, nuclear weapons became 
a way to deter future conventional war with India that might threaten further 
territorial losses or even the survival of the state. Pakistan opted to pursue its 
nuclear-weapon efforts quietly, drawing on clandestine procurement of foreign 
technologies and equipment, and it was aided on several occasions by China. 
Importantly, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s 1977 coup d’état, which ush-
ered in a lengthy period of military rule in Pakistan, placed the responsibility 
for and control of nuclear-weapon development in the military’s hands, an 
arrangement unchanged since then, despite periods of democratic rule. As a 
result, the roles and requirements for nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national 
security policy have been defined by the military. Consequently, and in stark 
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contrast to India, most Pakistani officials and experts view nuclear weapons 
largely in terms of military capability.
Although the public record does not clearly indicate precise dates by which 
India and Pakistan possessed deliverable nuclear weapons, indirect deterrence 
signaling between the two began to emerge in the later stages of the 1986–
1987 Operation Brasstacks crisis, which started when India held a major mili-
tary exercise near the border.10 A crisis in Kashmir in 1990 saw more direct, 
albeit ambiguous, nuclear signaling, with references to the mutual possession of 
nuclear weapons made by senior military officers in both countries. These sig-
nals, and the potential that the situation might turn confrontational and escalate 
to nuclear use, spurred the United States to intervene to defuse the crisis.11 
These early experiences with nuclear-shadowed crises appear to have rein-
forced the very different views held by the policy elite in each country about 
the utility and practice of nuclear deterrence. In India, the events underscored 
that nuclear weapons were not primary instruments of India’s defense policy, 
and that the possession of nuclear weapons by both states 
made potential escalation very dangerous. In Pakistan, 
these crises affirmed that nuclear threats had what nuclear 
scholar Vipin Narang calls “catalytic” value—as a means 
for attracting the attention of outside powers, namely the 
United States, who would then intercede to calm tensions 
and, Pakistani strategists believed, validate the legitimacy 
of Pakistan’s grievances against India.12 Pakistani strate-
gists may have concluded after the 1990 Kashmir crisis 
that possession of nuclear weapons would allow Pakistan to give more direct 
support to proxy groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba that attack India, insofar as 
the risk of escalation could dissuade India from retaliating in a militarily sig-
nificant way.13 These attitudes persist, despite the maturation of nuclear tech-
nologies and gradual stockpiling of nuclear weapons by both states.
The 1998 nuclear tests not only brought the nuclear situation in South Asia 
more into the open but also forced India and Pakistan to grapple with the need 
to formulate and enunciate policies on nuclear deterrence that would reassure 
the international community that both states would be responsible stewards 
of nuclear weapons and materials. They faced enormous international pressure 
following the tests, including through United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolution 1172, which urged India and Pakistan “to exercise maximum 
restraint,” “to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues,” 
and “to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes.”14 Although this 
resolution was roundly criticized in both countries, international concerns did 
seem to factor into their decisionmaking and posturing following the nuclear 
tests. Namely, both sides emphasized restraint as a central principle in their 
respective emerging nuclear doctrines.
Indeed, for a time it seemed that nuclear weapons could stabilize the sub-
continent. The then prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari 
Early experiences with nuclear-shadowed 
crises appear to have reinforced the very 
different views in India and Pakistan about the 
utility and practice of nuclear deterrence.
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Vajpayee of India, met first in New York in September 1998 and then in Lahore 
in February 1999 and announced a series of nuclear-related confidence-build-
ing measures. This progress was quickly halted, however, by the Kargil conflict 
between India and Pakistan in spring 1999.15 Notably, the overt possession of 
nuclear weapons by both sides did not deter Pakistan from undertaking the Kargil 
operation or India from responding and escalating the level of violence with the 
use of airpower. However, it is clear from New Delhi’s policy deliberations at the 
time that concerns about the potential for nuclear escalation and India’s desire to 
be seen as a responsible nuclear power did constrain India’s response.16 
Following the Kargil conflict, as Indian officials and experts contemplated 
developing a nuclear doctrine, an overriding concern was “to establish India’s 
role as a responsible nuclear-armed state that is willing to pursue confidence-
building measures . . . in its region,” former Indian nuclear envoy Rakesh Sood 
explained in 2014.17 Accordingly, in August 1999 when the Indian government 
released a report prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) on 
the parameters for India’s nuclear policy, it prefaced doctrinal pronouncements 
with a reiteration of prior Indian positions on the NPT, disarmament, and 
nonproliferation. The NSAB report stressed that “India’s primary objective is 
to achieve economic, political, social, scientific and technological development 
within a peaceful and democratic framework.”18 It then described the three 
major pillars of Indian nuclear policy: credible minimum deterrence; no first 
use of nuclear weapons; and “punitive retaliation” to inflict “unacceptable” 
damage in response to a nuclear attack on India. The report clarified that “the 
fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat 
of use of nuclear weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces.” It 
further indicated that India would develop a triad of nuclear forces and would 
organize these forces and command-and-control systems “for very high surviv-
ability against surprise attacks and for rapid punitive response.” The unofficial 
status of this document—a report from a group of civilian expert advisers to 
the government—obscured whether it reflected India’s official policy, but the 
ideas contained in the report were closely aligned with those stated by govern-
ment officials on several occasions.19 
In January 2003, just three months after the conclusion of the 2001–2002 cri-
sis, in which India massed half a million troops on the international border with 
Pakistan in Operation Parakram, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security 
released a short statement that made India’s doctrine official. It reiterated most 
of the major points of the 1999 draft doctrine but altered two of the pillars in 
important ways. The no-first-use policy was caveated, so that India might retali-
ate to a nuclear attack not just on Indian territory but also “on Indian forces any-
where.” And “punitive retaliation” was reconfigured as “massive” retaliation.20 
These changes leave much to interpretation; their significance and how they fig-
ure in the current Indian discourse will be addressed later.21 
Since India’s doctrine established that nuclear weapons would be used only 
to deter a nuclear attack, Indian strategists searched for non-nuclear options to 
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deter, dissuade, or compel Pakistan to cease supporting or harboring groups 
that attack India. Operation Parakram was in some ways effective in extract-
ing concessions from Pakistani leaders: to agree to outlaw Lashkar-e-Taiba 
and cease supporting militant infiltration in Kashmir.22 But this slow, massive 
mobilization came at a very heavy price and frustrated Indian military leaders 
and security analysts who felt that the eschewal of punitive military action 
weakened India’s deterrence and compellence of Pakistan. 
The putative Cold Start doctrine—an Indian Army plan to transform the 
military to be able to mobilize rapidly and execute punitive combined forces 
thrusts into Pakistani territory—offered a visible example of the Indian Army’s 
search for more effective means to coerce Pakistan, drawing on the lessons of 
Operation Parakram.23 But the essential problem in India’s effort to develop 
military options—to put conventional rungs on the escalation ladder below 
the nuclear threshold—is that Pakistan’s nuclear strategy and capabilities are 
intended to deter exactly such options. The more it seems that India is contem-
plating robust and timely conventional military operations, the more Pakistani 
military leaders seek to raise the salience of first use of nuclear weapons to deter 
such operations. While India was wrestling with and ultimately opting not to 
execute a doctrine like Cold Start from 2002 through the 2008 Mumbai cri-
sis, Pakistan was developing new nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles 
whose purpose was clearly enunciated when Pakistani officials began to talk in 
2011 of exercising “full-spectrum” deterrence.24 
In Pakistan’s parlance, a full-spectrum policy entails the ability to deter 
threats at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Short-range nuclear 
delivery vehicles integrated with Pakistan’s military command structure and 
coupled with the full-spectrum declaratory language are intended to give this 
concept sufficient credibility to deter India from exercising military options at 
any of these levels of conflict. In a crisis, Pakistan presumably would deploy 
tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield to make this threat, and atten-
dant escalation risk, a real possibility. One newer missile system—the mobile, 
60-kilometer-range (about 40-mile-range), multiple-tube-launched Nasr—is 
advertised by Pakistani officials specifically for this purpose, and more point-
edly as an answer to India’s Cold Start concept.25 If deterrence fails, Nasr mis-
siles could be used to target Indian tank battalions in a confrontation, perhaps 
on Pakistani soil. Employment of limited nuclear options in this manner nec-
essarily lowers the threshold for nuclear use, while simultaneously increasing 
the potential for nuclear retaliation and escalation. These risks are meant both 
to deter India and to play on the international community’s fears of nuclear 
war in South Asia.26 
Some Indian analysts doubt Pakistan’s technical capabilities to conduct 
full-spectrum nuclear operations and dismiss the threat to do so as a bluff 
to generate alarm, confound a slow-moving Indian policy process, and cata-
lyze outside intervention.27 Looking back at the period of crisis and conflict 
since 1990, however, many analysts assess that Pakistan’s nuclear posture has 
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effectively deterred India from undertaking conventional military responses 
or otherwise escalating militarized crises. Vipin Narang finds, for instance, 
that “Pakistan has been able to uniquely and directly achieve deterrent success 
against India.”28 This is quite a strong conclusion and probably overstates the 
specific role of Pakistan’s nuclear posture in deterrence, while undervaluing 
the cautious approach of India’s civilian leaders, who have tended to eschew 
risks of escalation that might threaten other governing priorities, particularly 
economic growth. 
However, Indians recognize that nuclear weapons will not deter Pakistan 
and terrorists from perpetrating small-scale violence against India. The late 
P. R. Chari, one of India’s eminent thinkers on nuclear strategy, asserted for 
example that
nuclear weapons cannot provide any defense against the subconventional 
threats to India’s national security from extremist elements within its own 
territory or, especially, against those who receive moral and material assistance 
from across the border. . . .
Nuclear deterrence can only provide security against the use of nuclear weap-
ons or a major conventional attack. . . . In other words, nuclear deterrence 
cannot accomplish any vital national security goals other than preventing an 
adversary from using nuclear weapons.29
Indian foreign policy experts and officials tend to share the view that the sole 
purpose of India’s nuclear weapons should be to deter nuclear aggression.30 But 
for others, Pakistan’s current nuclear posture amounts to what Shyam Saran 
terms “nuclear blackmail,” and thus India’s nuclear weapons ought to be pos-
tured to counter it.31 One central figure in former prime minister Manmohan 
Singh’s government summed up the situation this way in a 2014 interview:
The new debate over nuclear policy has started because tactical nuclear weap-
ons are being developed and deployed in Pakistan, so how do we respond? 
Pakistan is turning to Cold War tenets that were proved untenable before. 
Why should we follow them? The mainstream view here has been remarkably 
consistent. The military may want more options and symmetry—the usual 
macho sentiment—but this can be swiftly put aside.32
As this view makes clear, the debate about India’s doctrine is in many ways a 
larger contest about foreign policy and nuclear strategy. For forty years, India’s 
nuclear weapons have served primarily domestic and foreign policy objec-
tives of projecting India as a major technological power. Deterrence has been 
more an abstract concept and a secondary objective, rather than a military 
tool, especially insofar as military officers and planners have been deliberately 
excluded from decisions about nuclear policy, doctrine, and force posture. It 
is therefore not a coincidence that many of the more strident voices in India’s 
nuclear debate are retired military officers. They contend that much is wrong 
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with India’s nuclear policy and argue that corrections to doctrine, posture, and 
capabilities can provide India greater leverage to change Pakistan’s calculus.
Nuclear Debates
Many of the current debates among Indian experts began well before the 
nuclear tests in 1998 and the release of the NSAB doctrine report in 1999.33 
But this issue gained political prominence during the 2014 Indian general 
election for several reasons. Among these, India’s civilian and military leaders 
had not found feasible military options to punish Pakistan following the 2008 
attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai. India appeared to be falling behind 
Pakistan in both quantity and quality of nuclear weapons and delivery vehi-
cles, as Pakistan introduced the Nasr missile and announced its posture of 
full-spectrum deterrence. And Indian military officers expressed frustration at 
the slow pace and lack of prioritization accorded management and control of 
Indian nuclear forces. These factors led former foreign minister Jaswant Singh, 
for example, to assert in 2011 that the nuclear policy he had helped put in 
place after the 1998 tests was “very greatly in need of revision because the 
situation that warranted the enunciation of the policy of ‘no-first-use’ or ‘non-
use against non-nuclear weapons,’ ‘credible deterrence with minimum force,’ 
etc. has long been overtaken by events. You cannot continue to sit in yester-
day’s policy. We need to re-address it.”34 Picking up this argument, the drafters 
of the 2014 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) election manifesto charged that the 
“strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on 
the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress [government 
of Manmohan Singh].”35
These factors, with impetus added by the BJP election manifesto, have 
spurred thinking about how changes in Indian nuclear doctrine and capabili-
ties might better motivate the Pakistani security establishment to demobilize 
militant groups that attack India. (Officially, Pakistan denies support as well as 
culpability for the actions of these groups.) Interest in altering India’s nuclear 
policy comes generally from a perception that, in the pointed words of retired 
Indian Air Marshal Brijesh Jayal, it is “good in theory, but not credible in 
practice.”36 Responding to this sense of inadequacy, Indian National Security 
Adviser Ajit Doval stressed during an October 2014 speech that India will have 
“an effective deterrence capability which is credible.”37 
Yet, this is clearly not a boundless debate. There are limits to what even 
those who argue for more options are willing to entertain. As one former head 
of Indian Strategic Forces Command indicated in a 2014 interview, speaking 
of the U.S. effort to develop limited nuclear options in the 1960s and 1970s, 
“Nowhere has it worked. [Former defense secretary Robert] McNamara repu-
diated it. There is no realistic model for it. It has arms race potential.”38 Thus, 
the room for potential changes in Indian nuclear policy seems relatively narrow 
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at this juncture. But in order to weigh possible future options, it is necessary to 
consider arguments about India’s current nuclear policy and capabilities. The 
three streams of argument that are most pertinent have to do with India’s no-
first-use (NFU) policy, massive retaliation, and nuclear inferiority. 
No First Use
Consistent with what Rakesh Sood calls the “moralpolitik” that drove India’s 
nuclear-related foreign policy from the 1960s, as well as the conviction that 
nuclear weapons are political tools not intended to be used in a military con-
flict, no first use of nuclear weapons has been an enduring feature of India’s 
nuclear strategy.39 The 1999 and 2003 doctrinal statements reiterated the NFU 
policy, though both also introduced caveats. Fealty to no first use remains 
strong among Indian politicians and strategists. Then prime ministerial can-
didate Narendra Modi, for example, in early 2014 declared it a “reflection of 
our cultural inheritance.”40 Still, long-standing reservations also exist about the 
credibility and relevance of India’s NFU policy to its strategic environment.
One scenario in particular seems to concern Indian strategists: if Pakistani 
leaders opted to cross the nuclear threshold and use nuclear weapons against 
Indian armored forces entering Pakistani territory, Pakistani leaders would also 
face the risk that this initial use might spark an Indian nuclear response—as 
specified by India’s doctrine. This possibility might encour-
age Pakistan’s leadership to seek to limit damage from a 
possible Indian retaliatory nuclear attack by simultane-
ously launching a large strike against India’s nuclear arsenal, 
thereby degrading India’s capability to retaliate massively. 
According to this scenario, India’s NFU policy could give 
Pakistani leaders confidence that they could deter or defeat 
a conventional military campaign by India in retaliation to a terrorist attack. 
The possibility that India would face significant devastation on its own territory, 
without the capability to respond in ways that threaten unacceptable damage, 
would degrade the credibility of Indian deterrence. 
This seems to be a major concern, for example, of former Indian strategic 
forces commander Lieutenant General B. S. Nagal, who asserts, “NFU implies 
probable large scale destruction in [India].” He extends the logic further: 
NFU policy cannot conduct a first strike on the adversary’s counterforce tar-
gets, thus allowing the adversary full capability to attrite [India’s] capability. 
In the current environment of mobile systems on land and [ballistic missile 
submarines] at sea, the probability of destruction of the adversary strategic 
assets will be extremely low or negligible in a second strike, this therefore 
limits [India’s] retaliatory nuclear strikes to counter value targets, once again 
a moral dilemma.41
Conceivably, India could address this issue by introducing additional ambi-
guity into its declaratory policy, beyond the existing caveat that permits use 
Fealty to no first use remains strong among 
Indian politicians and strategists.
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of nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack on Indian forces anywhere. If 
Pakistani leaders had reason to doubt that India would be bound to no first use 
(which some of them already are inclined to doubt), they would be less certain 
that India would not try to preempt or disarm Pakistan before it could launch a 
large countercapability nuclear strike. This would enhance the perceived cred-
ibility of India’s deterrence against a first strike, while also reducing the pos-
sibility that a large portion of India’s nuclear assets might be destroyed in a 
major counterforce attack. For these reasons, P. R. Chari concluded in 2014 
that “adoption of a deliberately vague policy in regard to nuclear retaliation by 
India, instead of the certitude of a no-first-use declaration, might have better 
served India’s overall strategic ends.”42
Massive Retaliation
It is not clear what drove Indian officials to change the terminology from “puni-
tive” to “massive” retaliation between the 1999 and 2003 doctrinal statements. 
The timing of the 2003 statement, coming on the heels of the 2001–2002 
crisis and Operation Parakram, may indicate frustration and simply a desire 
for tough public posturing.43 Whereas punitive suggests proportionality and 
flexibility in the scale of a nuclear counterattack, massive is far less nuanced 
and intended to leave no doubt that any nuclear attack will invite widespread 
and perhaps total destruction. As one participant in a November 2014 policy 
seminar in New Delhi averred, “If you say proportionate response, that invites 
war-fighting. Massive retaliation is better; they will be deterred.”44 
One justification for the massive retaliation policy, offered by Shyam Saran 
in 2013, rests on the conviction that there is no distinction between strategic 
and tactical nuclear use: “Any nuclear exchange, once initiated, would swiftly 
and inexorably escalate to the strategic level.”45 Because the sole purpose of 
India’s nuclear-weapon posture is to deter use of nuclear weapons against 
India, as opposed to lesser contingencies, India can treat all nuclear threats 
equally. This should deter Pakistani first use even if it is against Indian troops 
on Pakistani territory. As another participant at the New Delhi seminar put it, 
“We have no doubt they can do residual damage to India, but the possibility 
that we would hit them massively will deter them.”46 
For proponents of this policy, massive retaliation is an important bulwark 
against sliding into contemplation of limited nuclear war or even war-fighting. It 
is a necessary condition for preserving the political nature of India’s deterrence. 
But just as there are potential issues of credibility with no first use, massive 
retaliation also invites skepticism. 
Retired Admiral Raja Menon, for instance, asserts that “the ideational sys-
tems that will ensure the ‘massive’ retaliation promised in the doctrine are being 
increasingly questioned by scholars and analysts worldwide.”47 Chari similarly 
found massive retaliation, to include countervalue targeting, “an unrealis-
tic certitude because, ethically, punishing large numbers of noncombatants 
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contravenes the laws of war. Besides, threatening massive retaliation against 
any level of nuclear attack, which would inevitably trigger assured nuclear anni-
hilation in a binary adversarial situation, is hardly a credible option.”48 Manoj 
Joshi, a leading Indian strategic affairs journalist, adds that some in India do 
not “believe that if Pakistan uses a singular nuclear detonation for signalling 
purposes, a massive retaliatory response is likely or, indeed, in India’s security 
interest.”49 If the choice before Indian decisionmakers is all or nothing, the 
threshold for an order to execute massive retaliation will be quite high, inten-
sifying dilemmas in responding, for example, to a demonstration nuclear blast 
by Pakistan or confined detonations on the battlefield in Pakistan. Graduated 
responses would in theory lower the political threshold for ordering nuclear 
retaliation and could—if escalation could be managed—prevent major dam-
age that would result from a large nuclear exchange. 
Were Pakistan to use nuclear weapons first in a limited way, the resolve 
required of India’s civilian and political leaders to follow through on the com-
mitment to massive retaliation would be harshly tested. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the political credibility of massive retaliation invites skepticism, 
as well as worry. Indian nuclear expert Manpreet Sethi argues, for instance, 
that India should “focus on enhancing the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. 
Pakistan does not doubt India’s capability, but its political will in mounting 
retaliation. . . . The doubt in the mind of the adversary appears to be whether 
India with a strategic culture of military restraint would 
find it prudent, and more importantly, morally acceptable 
to inflict damage (and risk more on itself) in response to 
a threat that is not itself mortal.”50 Nagal also describes 
the political commitment problem that currently exists for 
India: “It is absolutely certain, resolved, definite, unambig-
uous and assured that the political leadership will take cor-
rect decisions in the face of nuclear attacks.”51 It is not clear 
whether he is seeking to reassure himself that India’s politi-
cal leadership would follow through with massive retaliation or, more subtly, 
that he is highlighting the improbability that India’s leaders would make such 
a decision. Given these doubts about massive retaliation, many Indian experts, 
former officials, and retired military officers unsurprisingly urge shifting to 
an assured retaliation posture that does not depend on such a high political 
threshold—for example, a return to the prior, punitive response formulation 
contained in the 1999 NSAB report. 
Nuclear Inferiority
Pakistan’s development of the Nasr ballistic missile and the Ra’ad and Babur 
cruise missiles provides it with several full-spectrum deterrence delivery 
options—assuming it has also invested in enabling capabilities, command 
and control, and operational concepts that permit their use in counterforce 
Many Indian experts, former officials, and retired 
military officers unsurprisingly urge shifting 
to an assured retaliation posture that does not 
depend on such a high political threshold.
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roles—capabilities that Pakistan may not have perfected yet.52 In recent years, 
Pakistan has quadrupled its plutonium production capability, adding to the 
facilities it possesses to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Estimates from 
2015 of Indian and Pakistani fissile material production capability suggested 
that Pakistan may be able to make four or more nuclear weapons for each one 
that India can make, provided India does not also expand its fissile material 
production capacity or utilize reactors that otherwise generate electricity for 
the power grid.53 
Recently, awareness has grown in India that it has fallen behind Pakistan 
in nuclear capability. For instance, in a 2011 speech before the Lok Sabha, 
Jaswant Singh warned, “Pakistan is already in possession of about 100-110 
nuclear warheads that are deliverable whereas I know that India has 50 to 
60. I do not know why we are keeping these facts as hidden. Why are we 
not having an open debate about this matter?”54 If India remains primarily 
concerned about the minimum in its policy of credible minimum deterrence, 
then whether or not Pakistan has twice as many nuclear weapons as India need 
not matter. But if it is more concerned with the credibility of this policy, then 
relative capabilities are important.55 This is especially true in the strategic situ-
ation in which India’s immediate objective is to create conditions for winning 
an escalatory contest of conventional forces in response to a subconventional 
attack emanating from Pakistan.
Since 1998, and really since the 1980s, India has been content to build its 
nuclear arsenal slowly.56 In 1999, the NSAB report indicated that India would 
pursue a triad of delivery vehicles. Air-delivered bombs were the first option 
India possessed. Since then it has inducted several variants of the Prithvi and 
Agni nuclear-capable ballistic missiles into its arsenal, such that it is now able 
to reach Beijing with nuclear weapons. The sea leg of its triad has been slow-
est to mature. In late 2014, India initiated sea trials of its first indigenously 
constructed (with substantial Russian assistance) nuclear-powered submarine, 
the INS Arihant, which was declared ready for service in early 2016.57 India 
plans to construct two additional boats in this class before building a larger 
submarine more suited for lengthy deterrence patrols and capable of carry-
ing missiles with longer ranges.58 India also has been developing short- and 
medium-range nuclear sea-launched ballistic missiles to be deployed on its sub-
marines.59 Notwithstanding these developments, India still remains years away 
from a fully operational sea leg of its triad that could give the desired assured 
second-strike capability.60
Two other issues have exacerbated the concerns that emerge from the combi-
nation of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear superiority and the languid development 
of India’s nuclear arsenal. The first is that some quarters in India are skepti-
cal that the thermonuclear device reportedly tested in May 1998 actually per-
formed as claimed by the scientists who conducted the test. Weapons with high 
yields are meant to provide the backbone of India’s massive retaliation posture. 
Controversy erupted in September 2009 when K. Santhanam, a senior scientist 
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from India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in 
charge of instrumentation during the 1998 nuclear tests, claimed that the 
thermonuclear test “fizzled.”61 Government agencies and a number of other 
scientists involved in the tests rebutted Santhanam’s claims, but apparently 
there was sufficient concern that the prime minister’s office ordered a secret 
committee to investigate.62 Further questioning the viability of this design, 
Santhanam asserted “that even after 11 years the [thermonuclear] device has 
not been weaponised by [the Bhabha Atomic Research Center] while the 25 
kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed on 
multiple weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 
missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our [credible minimum 
deterrent]. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton [thermonuclear] bomb can 
do so which we do not have.”63 While yields at the lower end of Santhanam’s 
postulated range could be achieved by boosted-fission weapons as distinct 
from thermonuclear ones, the concerns about the political credibility of India’s 
nuclear doctrine are now matched by doubts about the technical credibility of 
India’s nuclear weapons.64
The second issue is the consistent lackluster performance of India’s DRDO, 
which has a documented record of overpromising and underdelivering on the 
development of major weapons systems. In a book on India’s military modern-
ization, for example, Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta concluded in 2010 
that the “DRDO has not delivered a single major weapon system to the armed 
forces in five decades of existence.”65 Press releases from the DRDO follow-
ing missile test launches almost always claim perfect performance, but there 
has been no independent public audit of the organization to examine whether 
these claims are true. Skepticism abounds, particularly among military officers. 
International security scholar Gaurav Kampani noted in 2014 that the military 
and the DRDO “have clashed over whether the testing of components and 
subsystems in test facilities is a robust proxy for complete system tests under 
realistic launch conditions. Only recently has the Strategic Forces Command 
. . . the Indian military agency responsible for nuclear operations, begun the 
process of randomly selecting missiles from the existing inventory and test-
firing them independently.”66 It seems reasonable to wonder whether an agency 
that lacks the full trust of its military customers will be able to deliver on the 
high-technology systems needed for a nuclear posture more demanding than 
massive retaliation.67
India not only is apparently behind in the quantity of nuclear weapons 
but also appears to be qualitatively behind Pakistan when it comes to nuclear 
missiles. There are doubts that India’s nuclear scientific enterprise is capable 
of producing more advanced and accurate nuclear weapons without a major 
overhaul. As Indian strategists consider ways to strengthen deterrence with 
Pakistan, clearly the credibility of nuclear capabilities must be foremost among 
the issues to address. 
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The Appeal of Escalation Dominance
Behind these issues lies a deceptively tricky question: How can India make its 
nuclear doctrine and posture more credible in ways that would buttress India’s 
overall deterrence of Pakistani subconventional violence? If the basic issue is, as 
Vipin Narang asserts, that Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture provides 
dominant deterrence compared to India’s assured retaliation posture,68 then 
one way India could enhance deterrence is by making its nuclear posture more 
like Pakistan’s.
Western strategic literature uses an arcane term for the challenge that 
derives from deterrence: escalation dominance. In the words of a contemporary 
RAND study, escalation dominance is “a condition in which a combatant has 
the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous or costly to 
the adversary while the adversary cannot do the same in return, either because 
it has no escalation option or because the available options would not improve 
the adversary’s situation.”69 This terminology gained prominence during the 
1960s as U.S. nuclear strategists contemplated fighting a war against the Soviet 
Union under conditions of relative nuclear parity. It is a useful concept for 
weighing the conditions that might contribute to deterrence. The simplistic 
view is that “success through escalation dominance depended on a favorable 
asymmetry of capabilities,” Lawrence Freedman explains.70 Classic deterrence 
strategy would suggest that Pakistan holds such an advantage in its apparent 
willingness and capability to escalate up the ladder.
But as with many theories of nuclear strategy, the concept does not permit 
absolute conclusions and instead defaults to uncertain psychology on critical 
points. After developing a highly detailed typology of 44 rungs on an escala-
tion ladder in his 1965 treatise On Escalation, for instance, Herman Kahn 
admitted that an important variable affecting escalation dominance “is each 
side’s relative fear of eruption [of violence]. That side which has least to lose by 
eruption, or fears eruption the least, will automatically have an element of esca-
lation dominance.”71 Contemporary psychological research also demonstrates 
the exceeding difficulty of accurately predicting how opponents perceive each 
other’s relative stakes in a given escalation scenario.72 
Reviewing the record of conflicts and crises in South Asia since 1990 
through a prism of escalation dominance indicates that the threat of any con-
flict becoming nuclear has had a dampening effect on Indian strategy and 
decisionmaking, even though nuclear deterrence has prevented major con-
ventional conflict.73 The possibility of escalation drove India to limit the geo-
graphic scope of its airstrikes during the 1999 Kargil crisis. It was also a major 
element of the decision calculus that led India to mobilize forces but not cross 
the border during the 2001–2002 crisis, and to limit responses to economic 
and diplomatic means following the attacks in Mumbai in 2008. None of the 
military options at India’s disposal in these confrontations could have been 
used in ways that would clearly avoid further escalation and thereby ensure 
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that India would prevent unacceptable harm to its overall strategic interests. 
By threatening use of nuclear weapons in response to effective Indian conven-
tional military operations, and by accepting a greater risk of escalation accord-
ingly, Pakistan has apparently prevented India from dominating the escalation 
ladder in South Asia. This despite India’s possession—in the minds of many 
analysts—of superior conventional military capability.74 
Pakistan’s acquisition of short-range nuclear weapons that it asserts can be 
used on the battlefield has compounded India’s deterrence dilemmas in ways 
that many analysts in both countries assess has served Pakistan’s interest. These 
Pakistani capabilities further frustrate India’s efforts to put conventional rungs 
on the escalation ladder below the nuclear threshold. Now, any potent kinetic 
option India evaluates must contend with the possibility that it could result 
in escalation to nuclear use by Pakistan at a relatively low threshold. Many 
Indian and Pakistani strategists believe that India’s current nuclear deterrence 
capabilities and doctrine are ineffective in this situation. 
If Indian policymakers were to accept this framing of the problem—that 
they need to find the means to address Pakistan’s capacity to deny India’s 
escalation dominance—then one obvious solution is to build more flexibil-
ity and symmetry into India’s nuclear force posture. Indian deterrence could 
be strengthened by developing operational concepts and capabilities to add 
nuclear rungs to the escalation ladder, rather than continuing to pursue 
only conventional escalation options that risk triggering 
Pakistani nuclear retaliation. As Indian defense expert Ali 
Ahmed writes in favor of this proposition, “Being able to 
respond at an equally low escalatory rung has the advan-
tage of permitting early conflict termination; retaining the 
moral high ground, important for political point scoring; 
and maintaining dominance at the same level of conflict. 
Escalation dominance in favor of India will encourage 
rationality in any Pakistani counter.”75 
During the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. strategists similarly 
recognized that the all-or-nothing nature of massive retaliation was no lon-
ger credible in deterring lower-order threats. The United States and its North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies spent much of the 1960s and 
1970s considering a range of nuclear strategies to deter Soviet aggression. From 
this deliberation emerged the official NATO doctrine of flexible response, the 
guiding principle of which was to acquire multiple options, both conventional 
and nuclear, to respond to the range of contingencies that might arise. Flexible 
response in U.S. policy is often associated with Robert McNamara, secretary 
of defense from 1961 to 1968, who emphasized the role of conventional forces 
in NATO strategy and questioned the utility of tactical nuclear weapons and 
limited nuclear war. European countries in NATO, fearing that this emphasis 
on conventional forces would make conflict more likely, pushed for a greater 
Some Indians argue that deterrence could 
be strengthened by developing concepts 
and capabilities to add nuclear rungs to the 
escalation ladder, rather than continuing to 
pursue conventional escalation options.
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focus on nuclear options.76 Ultimately, NATO did not undertake the posited 
buildup of conventional forces that was called for to raise the nuclear threshold. 
In 1974, Richard Nixon’s administration adopted a policy that focused 
more heavily on limited nuclear options to “enable the United States to con-
duct selected nuclear operations, in concert with conventional forces, which 
protect vital U.S. interests and limit enemy capabilities to continue aggression. 
In addition, these options should enable the United States to communicate to 
the enemy a determination to resist aggression, coupled with a desire to exercise 
restraint.”77 The United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, as 
well as in East Asia, in order to implement this policy and to extend deterrence 
to its allies. (The United States still deploys such weapons in Europe.) 
Notwithstanding U.S. efforts to address the major challenges presented by 
these concepts, the findings from multiple war games suggested that tacti-
cal nuclear weapons were incredibly difficult to integrate with maneuver war-
fare, raised thorny command-and-control issues, did not ensure victory to the 
party that used them first, and would result in millions of civilian and military 
casualties.78 The debate about the correct approach to deterrence continued 
through the end of the Cold War and persists even today.79
Some U.S. scholars advocate that India adopt the logic of limited nuclear 
options to change the deterrence equation with Pakistan and assert escala-
tion dominance. For example, security scholar Evan Montgomery and for-
mer undersecretary of defense Eric Edelman argue that India should follow 
Pakistan’s lead and acquire limited nuclear capabilities that would allow it to 
target Pakistani military assets. They suggest that doing so 
could potentially deter nuclear use in the event of a limited conventional con-
flict. That is, by holding out the threat of a symmetrical and proportional 
response, [India] would avoid the ‘all or nothing’ nuclear retaliation dilemma 
it now seems to face. . . . Confronting an opponent with its own battlefield 
nuclear weapons, Islamabad could not reasonably conclude that limited 
nuclear strikes against invading ground forces would stop an invasion without 
triggering a nuclear reprisal.80
Were India to adopt this approach and evolve its doctrine and nuclear pos-
ture to execute it, the deterrence balance between the two states could shift. 
Pakistan, according to this line of argument, would lose confidence that it 
could dominate India in the escalatory process between conventional war and 
nuclear use. India’s threat to retaliate in kind against limited Pakistani nuclear 
use on the battlefield would be more credible than massive retaliation, mean-
ing that Pakistan would have greater concern that its own nuclear first use 
would result in a nuclear reprisal. This would in effect force Pakistan to raise 
its nuclear threshold. Thus, according to this logic, the adoption of limited 
nuclear options could reopen space for Indian conventional military operations 
against Pakistan.
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If this logic operated in practice, limited nuclear options could give India 
greater leverage to deter Pakistan’s tolerance or embrace of proxy groups that 
attack India. Montgomery and Edelman explain:
As a result [of developing limited nuclear counterforce options], the threat of 
an Indian conventional assault in response to a major terrorist attack would 
become far more credible, and Pakistan would no longer be able to justify its 
support for militant proxies as a low-risk method of imposing costs on India. 
Under these conditions, it is even possible that Pakistan might be compelled to 
rein in militant groups rather than simply cut ties with them. . . . Should India 
achieve escalation dominance by posing credible conventional and nuclear 
retaliatory threats, therefore, Pakistan might actively seek to prevent militant 
groups from launching attacks on their own to avoid being held hostage by 
their actions.81
This logic is theoretically persuasive insofar as it has potential to break 
Pakistan’s linkage of subconventional warfare with nuclear deterrence. 
Symmetry of nuclear force posture and counterforce capabilities could allow 
India to punish Pakistan for future terror attacks in ways that are currently 
very difficult to contemplate, if not infeasible. Given that Pakistani leaders 
would have to worry about Indian reprisals for attacks that were not necessar-
ily sponsored or desired by the Pakistani state, Islamabad would have greater 
incentive to demobilize groups that threaten to conduct such attacks.
In practice, there are a host of challenges to carrying out this concept, as 
Indian officials and commentators recognize. No one has real-world experience 
in conducting battlefield nuclear warfare and controlling escalation. (Proponents 
would say that this historical fact validates the effectiveness of this form of 
nuclear deterrence.) If it were to proceed with limited nuclear options, India 
would face heavy financial, technological, and perhaps political-ideological bur-
dens. Moreover, it would need to develop the requisite force posture and, per-
haps, associated nuclear warheads and precision delivery systems, as well as the 
suite of enabling capabilities and command-and-control systems required for 
countercapability targeting, beyond those sufficient for massive retaliation. 
Capabilities to Fight a Nuclear War 
For limited nuclear options to be credible, the strategy must be paired with an 
operationalized nuclear force that has the capability to carry out strikes against 
military targets. A theoretical possibility of Indian limited nuclear options, 
absent real military capability, is not sufficient to deter Pakistan and gain esca-
lation dominance. 
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Damage Limitation
A central tenet of nuclear war-fighting, and indeed escalation dominance, is 
damage limitation. Damage limitation takes two forms: defensive capabilities 
and actions to reduce the damage the opponent can inflict through nuclear 
attacks, and offensive capabilities and actions to destroy the opponent’s nuclear 
forces before they can be used. The defensive component of damage limita-
tion includes capabilities such as antiballistic missile systems, as well as much 
broader civil defenses. Building bomb shelters, hardening critical infrastruc-
ture, and holding duck-and-cover exercises are manifestations of such defenses 
designed to enhance survivability in the face of a nuclear attack. 
Defensive damage limitation is a challenge for India. India possesses a sig-
nificant land mass, a large population, distributed resources, and multiple cen-
ters of commerce. In theory, and probably in reality, it could survive a feasible 
Pakistani nuclear attack today, under a minimal definition of survival. But 
even if India could limit damage on its own territory, the prevailing winds for 
much of the year would carry radioactive contamination from nuclear deto-
nations in Pakistan over large swaths of India including its agricultural belt 
and major population centers.82 Furthermore, building up civil defenses suf-
ficient to reconstitute governance after a nuclear attack is, needless to say, an 
exceedingly expensive proposition. Attempting to prepare a population for the 
possibility of nuclear attack is also a major political challenge, especially in 
a democracy. In an economically developing, a geographically diverse, and a 
politically fractious country such as India, the probability that a government 
could prioritize civil defense over other requirements is quite low. As Nagal 
admits, “In India there is not an iota of work on public awareness or construc-
tion of nuclear defence shelters for the public, no education of civil servants or 
bureaucrats, and our disaster management is knee jerk and extremely limited 
in scope.”83 
Another important component of a defensive damage limitation strategy is 
a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system to intercept incoming enemy nuclear 
missiles. If a decision to threaten or even to launch limited nuclear options is 
girded by the confidence of a missile defense capability, then the defense must 
work as advertised. India’s DRDO has been developing a missile defense system 
based on the Prithvi missile with an advertised capability to intercept missiles 
with a 2,000-kilometer (roughly 1,200-mile) range. DRDO officials indicate 
that the first phase of testing of this system is nearing completion, and it could 
be deployed—to protect either cities or Indian command and control—in the 
near future.84 Astoundingly, prior to a test failure in 2015, the DRDO claimed 
a 99.8 percent probability of hitting incoming missiles.85 But there is consider-
able skepticism in India’s strategic community that the DRDO can deliver on 
its BMD promise. Defense journalists Pravin Sawhney and Ghazala Wahab, 
for example, conclude that the “DRDO is woefully inadequate in all BMD 
subsystems as well as interceptors with acceptable assurance.”86 
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Given the DRDO’s track record and the skepticism of Indian analysts, it 
is fair to assume that unless India receives considerable external assistance, it 
probably is a decade or more away from being able to field a limited missile 
defense system. Even then, the efficacy of such a system and the ease with 
which it could be defeated by simple countermeasures or saturation with bal-
listic or cruise missiles would pose major questions about 
India’s ability to effectively limit damage in this manner. 
Simply put, India is in no position as of 2016, and will not 
be for the foreseeable future, to implement a comprehen-
sive defensive damage limitation strategy.
The offensive form of damage limitation is the ability 
to target the adversary’s nuclear assets as a way to reduce 
the number of nuclear weapons that might be detonated on 
one’s own territory. Currently, India’s nuclear arsenal and its 
no-first-use policy limit contemplation of nuclear counterforce targeting under 
most circumstances. It is conceivable that India might use conventionally armed 
ballistic or cruise missiles, or other air-delivered ordnance, to target Pakistani 
missile launchers. However, Pakistani air defenses and the country’s efforts to 
disperse and protect its nuclear forces make this an enormous technological and 
operational challenge.87 Of course, Pakistani strategists have thought through 
this possibility. One retired senior Pakistani military officer with considerable 
experience in nuclear matters made this assessment in a 2014 interview:
An Indian Air Force attack on Nasr is a hypothetical that won’t happen. 
Nasr would not be exposed early, before land operations began. So the idea 
that they could do preemptive or early air strike against it is just wrong. The 
Indians won’t have a chance to do counterforce air strikes before the war is on. 
. . . I am confident that they can’t take out more than 15–20 percent of our 
land and air force nuclear capabilities. There will be a balance of at least 50 
percent to hit back at them.88
Tellingly, this officer had clearly contemplated what counterforce options are 
present for Pakistan. “India is a flat country,” he offered. “There are a few moun-
tains in the middle of the country, but it is basically flat. A flat country has dif-
ficulty hiding weapons. We have a lot of mountains.”89 What he did not add is 
that Pakistan also has a diversity of nuclear delivery systems and an expanding 
nuclear arsenal that permits, at least, contemplation of a nuclear counterforce 
strike, with sufficient reserves for an assured second-strike capability.
Capability Requirements
If India were to develop limited nuclear options with a view toward a counter-
force capability, it would need to make major adjustments to at least two facets 
of its current nuclear practice. One change would involve the militarization of 
India’s nuclear strategy and decisionmaking, which would be a revolutionary 
shift in how India plans and executes its national security policy.90 The second 
Simply put, India is in no position as of 
2016, and will not be for the foreseeable 
future, to implement a comprehensive 
defensive damage limitation strategy.
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change would be the procurement of a suite of military hardware and software 
upgrades that would provide it with the capabilities to carry out precise, time-
sensitive nuclear strikes on Pakistani mobile missiles, which pose incredible 
targeting difficulties. 
India’s gradual development of its nuclear arsenal has left it facing what may 
be an emerging gap in nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan. If India chose to 
redress this gap and to develop credible limited nuclear options for counterforce 
targeting, the Indian leadership would need to direct considerable attention 
both to the bureaucratic problems that have plagued India’s military mod-
ernization and to the fragmented complex that produces various components 
of India’s nuclear-weapon systems. Principally, this would require instilling a 
new culture of performance and coordination, rather than the policy paralysis, 
secrecy, and compartmentalization that has characterized India’s weaponiza-
tion efforts since the 1980s.91 Some organizational changes—the formation 
of a Strategic Forces Command and an interagency nuclear planning advisory 
group in the prime minister’s office—have already enhanced centralized deci-
sionmaking. But to address performance deficits, India’s leaders would need to 
strengthen oversight and to conduct independent technical audits of organiza-
tions such as the Department of Atomic Energy and the DRDO. Perhaps more 
critically, new linkages would need to be forged between the Strategic Forces 
Command and the Integrated Defense Staff in order to develop operational 
concepts for carrying out limited counterforce operations in a crowded theater 
of war.92 This would include working through command-and-control proce-
dures to maintain positive launch authority through the Nuclear Command 
Authority (NCA) centralized in the prime minister’s office, rather than del-
egating launch authority to military commanders in the field.93 These software 
system requirements are just as important as nuclear hardware in signaling 
credibility, yet tend to receive far less attention. In India and elsewhere, it is 
tempting for participants in policy debates to focus on hardware—which in 
principle can simply be purchased—rather than on software and associated 
critical infrastructure protection that requires reforming institutions and stan-
dard operating procedures. 
That said, the hardware requirements for credible limited nuclear options 
are daunting. The need to be able to identify, target, and strike conventional 
military forces and mobile nuclear assets in a short time period underscores 
these challenges. It would be tempting for the Indian bureaucracy to try to 
circumvent these broader requirements by fitting a small warhead on an exist-
ing short-range delivery system and declaring that to be a sufficient capability. 
But absent a strategy that considers the implications for escalation, as well 
as adoption of operational concepts that make execution of limited nuclear 
options credible, a rudimentary capability alone will not produce escalation 
dominance. Adoption of anything short of the full capabilities described below 
would raise dangers by allowing India’s Nuclear Command Authority to avoid 
thinking through the challenges of controlling escalation and fighting nuclear 
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war, as well as degrade the credibility and posited deterrence value of limited 
nuclear options.
First, fissile material requirements for counterforce targeting can be sizable, 
given the need to cover a very large set of military targets in addition to cit-
ies. Recognizing concerns about escalation and a desire to limit nuclear dam-
age, the target set could exceed 100 locations. Considering the need for some 
level of redundancy in targeting, India would potentially have to treble its 
current stockpile of nuclear weapons.94 Growth in the arse-
nal is limited by relatively modest plutonium production 
from the Dhruva reactor, which is sufficient to add per-
haps five weapons per year to the arsenal.95 (This assumes 
India would utilize smaller, plutonium-based nuclear war-
heads given size and weight restrictions for tactical deliv-
ery systems.) Thus, to develop limited nuclear options in 
the short term, India would need additional plutonium 
production pathways. One option would be to utilize one 
or more of its larger, unsafeguarded nuclear power reactors. Another future 
option would be to separate plutonium from the blanket of the prototype fast 
breeder reactor under construction.96 Finally, India has announced plans to 
build a Dhruva-2 reactor, which may yield greater plutonium output.97 Any 
of these options could, with varying degrees of time and cost, satisfy larger 
plutonium requirements.
A second requirement is nuclear-capable delivery systems with sufficient 
mobility, readiness, and accuracy to be effective for counterforce missions. 
India’s current fleet of Prithvi and Agni missiles can carry heavy payloads of 
around 1,000 kilograms, but they are not sufficiently accurate for targeting the 
array of Pakistani nuclear and conventional military assets, especially mobile 
missiles and associated enabling platforms. The Prithvis also utilize liquid fuel, 
making them less well suited to a battlefield role. Instead, these missiles are 
better suited for targeting cities for massive retaliation. Existing, albeit older-
generation, nuclear-capable aircraft may provide an alternative option, but 
Indian planners would worry about the ability of these aircraft to penetrate 
Pakistani air defenses. These systems today do not provide India with a high-
confidence capability, if accompanied by changes in posture and doctrine, to 
achieve some manner of escalation dominance. India probably would do better 
to develop new short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles geared 
toward tactical counterforce operations.
India has begun to develop more accurate cruise and ballistic missiles. One of 
these, the 150-kilometer-range (about 100-mile-range) Prahaar, is advertised as a 
tactical, battlefield weapon and touted by the DRDO as having “high manoeu-
vrability, very high acceleration and excellent impact accuracy.”98 The DRDO 
also claims that the missile can carry “different types of warheads,” which is 
interpreted in Pakistan as evidence that it may have a nuclear role.99 Indeed, 
many Pakistanis believe that Prahaar was developed as India’s answer to the 
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Nasr.100 However, at 42 centimeters in diameter and with a payload of just 200 
kilograms, the missile is exceedingly slim and light and may not be able to carry 
any of India’s existing nuclear warheads. Notwithstanding Pakistani speculation 
about a nuclear mission for Prahaar, in India it is widely understood to be a con-
ventional missile with no plans for a nuclear-capable version. 
India has two cruise missile systems under development. The BrahMos, 
co-developed with Russia, is a short-range (300–500 kilometers, or about 
200–300 miles) supersonic missile that has land-attack and anti-ship variants 
capable of carrying payloads of 200–300 kilograms. With a diameter of 67 
centimeters, it is considerably larger than the Prahaar, and thus it could bet-
ter accommodate a nuclear payload. However, the BrahMos is intended for 
commercial sale as a conventionally armed missile and, like the Prahaar, has 
been inducted into India’s conventional force structure, not the strategic forces. 
Another domestically developed cruise missile, the Nirbhay, reportedly can 
carry heavier payloads up to 450 kilograms to a range of 1,000 kilometers. 
There is speculation that it may have a nuclear role, but some Indian analysts 
assert that since it uses Russian-made engines, India is not permitted to use 
it to carry nuclear weapons.101 (The same apparently is true of the BrahMos 
due to restrictions posed by the Missile Technology Control Regime, of which 
Russia is a member.) To resolve this situation, India would need to develop an 
indigenous propulsion system for cruise missiles, and news reports from 2015 
suggested that an indigenous engine is under development.102 
A third requirement for tactical nuclear weapons, given India’s potential 
delivery options, is a miniaturized nuclear warhead that could fit in small 
missiles with diameters ranging from 42 to 67 centimeters. Because India’s 
Prithvi and Agni missiles all have diameters of a meter or more and can carry 
1,000-kilogram payloads, it seems reasonable to guess that these characteris-
tics describe India’s standard nuclear fission design, purportedly a 25-kiloton 
warhead.103 The Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile (and the related, 
land-based Shourya ballistic missile) is reported to have a diameter of 75 cen-
timeters, suggesting that India has one warhead designed to fit these missiles. 
But shrinking a warhead of this size and weight an additional 40 percent would 
be a major engineering feat. (It is worth recalling that India claims to have 
tested in 1998 an improved fission device with a designed 12-kiloton yield, 
which some speculate had a warhead weight of just 220 kilograms,104 as well as 
three subkiloton experimental devices whose yields might be more appropriate 
for tactical, counterforce missions.) Miniaturization on this scale is not impos-
sible, of course. The U.S. W54 warhead, for example, weighed approximately 
22 kilograms and had a diameter of some 27 centimeters. However, having 
conducted so few full-scale nuclear tests, India could not have very high confi-
dence in the reliability of such a small weapon, which would add considerable 
risk to its employment of limited nuclear options.
Fourth and finally, mastering operation of the command, control, communi-
cations, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and 
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information fusion requirements for nuclear counterforce targeting, especially 
against mobile assets, is exceedingly difficult. One way to understand the enor-
mity of this challenge is to consider the steps and systems involved from target-
ing to detonation. Assuming India might seek to destroy Nasr missile batteries 
with ballistic or cruise missiles in response to a Pakistani nuclear strike against 
Indian armored battalions, India would need continuous, real-time visual cov-
erage from drones or satellites, as well as other signals intelligence, in order to 
identify and discriminate Nasr missiles from other military systems. Once the 
missiles were identified, information would need to be communicated securely 
through the Nuclear Command Authority to the Strategic Forces Command 
for targeting. The NCA would also want to ensure that Indian conventional 
forces were not in the vicinity so that it could diminish chances of fratricide. 
This would require constant communications through the Integrated Defense 
Staff. Additionally, the NCA would need to consider meteorological data to 
ensure that prevailing winds would not blow radioactive fallout to Indian 
population centers or agricultural areas. In the interim, it would have placed 
Indian nuclear forces on alert and dispersed them to the field, making them 
vulnerable to a broader Pakistani counterforce attack. If Pakistan observed or 
was concerned that India might be readying to use nuclear weapons, Pakistani 
commanders, rather than losing their nuclear weapons, might instead opt to 
use them. This suggests that India would need to perform the above steps in a 
very short time period, with airtight communications and low visibility. 
Little is publicly known about the systems India has in place to fulfill these 
requirements. As Nagal observes, “Since a large part of the C4ISR is confi-
dential in nature, doubts will always be raised on the efficacy of the systems 
in place.”105 Interviews from 2013 and 2014 with current and former senior 
Indian officials suggested that not all of these capabilities currently exist. For 
instance, a recently retired high-ranking air force officer indicated in an inter-
view, “We still have a long way to go to get to the point where we can react 
quickly with precision. We are not in a position to react quickly now. You need 
constant intelligence with high accuracy, which we don’t have.”106 India will 
need to double its current fleet of four intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance satellites, this officer added. 
Two additional matters regarding the capability requirements for limited 
nuclear options deserve mention, but will not be discussed in greater detail. 
The first is cost. Until now, India’s nuclear-weapon program has been relatively 
inexpensive, as it has not relied on a massive dedicated production complex 
with attendant long-life-cycle costs. Instead, for fissile material and delivery 
vehicles, India largely has depended on multipurpose facilities and technology 
research and development programs to fulfill nuclear-weapon requirements. 
Production of the capabilities described here, even if carried out on a relatively 
small scale, would necessitate financial outlays considerably greater than what 
India has spent to date. The second matter is security. Protecting a relatively 
small nuclear complex against internal and external threats is a major challenge, 
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and there continue to be widespread doubts about the measures and practices 
India has in place. That challenge becomes much harder when smaller, mobile 
nuclear missiles kept at higher levels of alert are added to 
an arsenal, with associated increases in the number of per-
sonnel required to safeguard and operate them. Neither of 
these matters is trivial; both must be considered before a 
decision is made to adopt limited nuclear options.
These challenges should also be contemplated prior to 
adopting or asserting a policy of limited nuclear options. 
In doing so, Indian decisionmakers would be wise to give 
special attention to the potential risks of declaring new 
policies before the capabilities exist to implement them. To announce a policy 
not backed up by credible capability would invite Pakistani countermoves that 
would be self-defeating for India or, worse, disastrous in the case of a miscal-
culation in a future crisis. But it would also be risky to develop some capability 
to employ limited nuclear options without working through the strategic and 
tactical implications in a formal way. 
What Happens After a Nuclear Strike?
Any answer to the question of whether nuclear conflict can remain limited ulti-
mately comes down to belief. This is the case because nuclear strategy is based 
on assumptions about human behavior that may or may not hold if a nuclear 
weapon were actually used during a conflict. Many of these assumptions—
such as rational decisionmaking by unitary actors, consistent preferences, and 
perfect information and communications—derive from the game-theoretic 
modeling conducted by Western strategists during the Cold War. But there 
is no empirical evidence about how states, and leaders of states, would actu-
ally behave during such a conflict to prove the validity of these assumptions. 
Indeed, much of what has been learned about the neuroscience and psychology 
of decisionmaking since the classics of nuclear theory were published should 
induce considerable caution about these assumptions.107 Experience from the 
U.S.-Soviet context, including the Cuban Missile Crisis and subsequent efforts 
at deterrence signaling, indicates that neat theories often are not supported by 
real-world evidence. Robert Jervis, whose 1980s work on the psychology of 
deterrence remains the standard in the field, assessed that no scholar has made 
a persuasive argument that nuclear war would be kept limited.108 
Consider the options available to India if deterrence failed and it suffered a 
small-scale nuclear first strike by Pakistan, such as during a Cold Start–style 
operation, and had developed capabilities and a force posture for tactical use of 
nuclear weapons. In addition to the options to back down or retaliate massively 
with nuclear weapons, India could press a conventional assault, relying on the 
real or perceived possibility that it might conduct nuclear strikes on Pakistani 
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military assets to deter a further nuclear attack. Or it could opt for a propor-
tionate nuclear strike against Pakistani targets on the battlefield or against mili-
tary targets further from the battle zone, such as supply lines, storage depots, or 
airfields. Exercising either of these options most likely would result in casual-
ties—including Indian—much greater than those suffered in the initial trigger-
ing terrorist event. And Pakistan’s counterresponse would remain unpredictable. 
But would the mere possession of these options be sufficient to compel Pakistan 
to end its tolerance of militants that attack India? The answer depends again on 
belief. In this instance, assessment might turn on how credible these options 
appear to Pakistan, and what one believes about how Pakistani leaders would 
respond if they concluded that India would choose either to sustain a conven-
tional campaign or to employ tactical nuclear weapons. 
In case India pressed ahead with a conventional advance, would Pakistan’s 
military leaders capitulate and seek to terminate the conflict after having 
already used nuclear weapons once without effect? Or would they double down 
and escalate further in the belief that India’s leaders are more risk averse and 
have more to lose? Given that Pakistanis tend to think of nuclear weapons 
in military terms, one suspects that if a first nuclear use intended for signal-
ing failed to deter India, Pakistan would worry that its deterrent had been 
eroded.109 Pakistani military leaders, having propounded a narrative that 
nuclear weapons would prevent war and deter existential threats, would face 
very strong pressures to escalate further. These pressures might result from 
a desire to demonstrate resolve and restore credibility of deterrent threats or 
to enact vengeance, or they might merely be based on incorrect assumptions 
about the results of further escalation, all regardless of whether India possessed 
tactical nuclear weapons or not. 
If India chose to respond with nuclear weapons on the battlefield, it is 
entirely possible Pakistani military leaders might misinterpret a supposedly 
limited Indian nuclear attack on Pakistani territory as the first salvo in a total 
war seeking elimination of the Pakistani state or its army. (Of course, Indian 
strategists who argue that massive retaliation is credible against Pakistan make 
a similar assumption in reverse: Pakistani leaders would 
perceive that even their own limited use of nuclear weap-
ons could be interpreted in India as an all-out attack, 
thereby triggering massive retaliation by India. Thus, the 
Indian argument goes, Pakistani leaders would not actu-
ally implement their first-use threat.) Given that Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons could be integrated with its regular army 
corps on the battlefield, or deployed at airbases that also 
have conventional assets, even a conventional Indian 
attack—let alone a nuclear one—on those facilities could be interpreted by 
Pakistan as nuclear preemption.110 In that case, might Pakistan face a “use or 
lose” situation and opt to escalate with nuclear strikes on targets in India to 
limit further nuclear damage? What would India do at that point, assuming 
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it retained second-strike nuclear forces? If conflict terminated at any of these 
points, would India be better off or more politically satisfied than it was prior 
to the escalation?
The “what happens next” question is at the heart of most Indian critical 
scholarship on limited nuclear conflict and has been an effective defense for 
Indian civilian leaders who push back against the urging of some military 
officers and hawkish analysts to develop limited nuclear options. Shyam Saran, 
for example, argues that India should reject “the notion that a nuclear war 
could be fought and won or that a limited nuclear war is at all credible.”111 
Some former military leaders appear to share this thinking. Retired Admiral 
Verghese Koithara warns that “whatever weight India might choose for its first 
retaliatory strike it should think carefully what that strike must seek to achieve. 
Revenge seeking and venting rage can have no place in this decision matrix. 
The primary objective at that point should be to stop nuclear strikes immedi-
ately.”112 But others prefer the possible deterrence gains that might come from 
limited options. Ali Ahmed, for one, argues that “a nuclear-weapons employ-
ment strategy of commensurate response, at least for early, lower order nuclear 
first use, is preferable. This would deter first use since such a response is guaran-
teed by self-deterrence caused by the fear of receiving unacceptable damage.”113 
Some Indian hawks prefer to go further, to the logical end of war-fighting. The 
Indian scholar Bharat Karnad, for instance, argues that “while deterrence is a 
mind-game, to nevertheless believe that New Delhi will be so psychologically 
bridled by the prospect of the loss of a few Indian cities as to not seek the logi-
cal end-state, full-fledged nuclear retaliation, is to discount the internal politi-
cal dynamic that will emerge once a nuclear first strike is absorbed and, in any 
case, is too big a risk for Pakistani strategists to court.”114 
These calculations are complicated by the role that China might play if a 
conflict were to turn nuclear and how Indian decisionmakers perceive China’s 
interests in the region. As one former senior Indian civilian official queried in 
a 2013 interview, “How will a nuclear exchange, often posited between India 
and Pakistan, impact on China, and would India be prudent not to factor that 
into its nuclear deterrence calculations?” More specifically, would China come 
to Pakistan’s defense in an escalating crisis, either by opening a second front 
to a conventional war or by threatening nuclear attack if India retaliated with 
nuclear weapons against Pakistan? The authors’ view is that China is unlikely 
to intervene with its own nuclear forces, especially if India had not initiated 
the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. However, as China pursues major 
infrastructure projects in Pakistan, and thousands of Chinese nationals reside 
there and could become casualties of Indian nuclear weapons, Beijing’s stakes 
in a potential Indo-Pakistani nuclear conflict will grow significantly. Would 
China be more likely to restrain Pakistan, to coerce India, both, or neither? 
“It is because of this complexity,” the same official concluded, “that notions of 
flexible response and counterforce targeting, which appeared to have a certain 
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logic in a binary U.S.-Soviet context, lose their relevance in the multidimen-
sional threat scenario which prevails in our region.”115
Would the Pakistani Military 
Rather Lose Than Use?
The view that proportionate or graduated nuclear responses permit nuclear 
conflicts to remain limited implies that states have an ability to control or man-
age escalation. But escalation control cannot be determined by a single state, 
rather it is the product of interactions between states. It requires all parties to 
a conflict to deliberately restrain their employment of military capabilities. In 
his classic work Strategy and the Missile Age, the American strategist Bernard 
Brodie concluded, “It takes only one to start a total war, but it takes two to 
keep a war limited. . . . The major question is: How large can a war get and still 
remain limited? . . . It is obvious that the larger the conflict, the more pressure 
there must be for abandoning limitations.”116 
With the exception of the 1971 war, which was anomalous in many ways, 
none of the wars fought between India and Pakistan has escalated signifi-
cantly in scale and time. In each of the conflicts and crises since partition, 
the two antagonists have observed important limits. Of the 1965 and 1971 
wars, for instance, P. R. Chari wrote in 2003 that both sides sought to control 
escalation by “excluding population centers as targets for air attack [that] was 
largely informed by an awareness of their mutual vulnerabilities. Neither India 
nor Pakistan could have defended their cities and retained the ‘war wastage 
reserves’ needed to prosecute the war. These circumstances have not changed, 
nor have the perceptions of the two military leaderships altered.”117 Other self-
imposed limitations are similarly notable. For example, during none of the 
confrontations has India abrogated the Indus Waters Treaty, which governs 
water sharing between the two countries, and disrupted Pakistan’s main source 
of water. Even the regular shelling along the Line of Control in Kashmir has a 
typical pattern of exchange that avoids upward pressures to escalate violence, 
although Narendra Modi’s government has changed this pattern by conduct-
ing disproportionate responses and advertising them. Only twice in the last 
twenty years has India escalated a confrontation in important ways that sur-
prised Pakistan: by utilizing airpower to target Pakistani positions in Kargil 
in 1999, and by expanding the scale and geographical scope of cross-border 
shelling along the working boundary in Kashmir in fall 2014. Yet, neither 
of these escalations provoked a Pakistani conventional counterescalation, sug-
gesting that both sides desired to keep the conflict at certain levels of violence 
and contained in Kashmir, rather than spilling onto the plains in Punjab. 
How might the mutual restraint necessary to contain a conflict work if both 
parties are postured to employ limited nuclear options? Would historical lim-
its on locations or scope of conflict continue to be observed, especially when 
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India faces considerable uncertainty about Pakistan’s nuclear redlines? In most 
respects, these questions are unanswerable. Brodie’s observation in 1959 still 
holds true: “When we describe limited war today as requiring deliberate non-use 
of a gigantically powerful military instrument, one that remains ready at hand 
to be used, we are differentiating modern limited war from anything that has 
happened in the past.”118 Chari similarly concluded that in South Asia, “There 
is no definite reply to these questions, which perplexes the strategic community 
and governments alike.”119 Thus, the certainty that mutual restraint will stay 
below the nuclear threshold is essentially an untested assumption about escala-
tion dominance, like many other concepts of nuclear deterrence.
The gains and losses experienced in the conduct of conflict itself can change 
opponents’ willingness to expand the means they use, as well as their objec-
tives. Regular exchange of artillery across the Line of Control is an example 
of mutual limits on the means of warfare. But take a different example, such 
as an Indian Cold Start operation with the objective of gaining and hold-
ing Pakistani territory—there are no explicit limits on the means India might 
undertake to achieve this territorial objective if Pakistan successfully stymied 
India’s initial thrusts. Even if Indian leaders knew their objectives were limited 
to a certain geographical depth, Pakistan’s leaders might not perceive this, and 
in any case, their objective would be to deter and/or deny India this territory. 
Once launched, India would face great domestic pressure 
to achieve its objective; terminating the conflict short of it 
would be considered a defeat. Alternatively, if India eas-
ily achieved its initial objective, its political leaders and/
or generals might also be tempted to expand their aims to 
seek greater bargaining leverage. 
Meanwhile, if Pakistan’s conventional military means 
were insufficient to deny victory to India, the military lead-
ership would suffer great reputational damage. According 
to retired Lieutenant General V. R. Raghavan, former 
Indian director general of military operations, the problem is, “How deep 
would be deep enough for India to obtain its objectives, and how deep would 
be too much for Pakistan, is unclear and will always remain so.”120 
India’s possession of limited nuclear options seems unlikely to deter 
Pakistan from using nuclear weapons first in circumstances that Pakistani 
leaders would perceive as existential defeat for the Pakistani military, even if 
India’s objectives were in fact limited. Neil Joeck, a veteran U.S. government 
analyst of South Asia, notes that “a country, like a man, cannot be hanged 
twice. Therefore, threatening Pakistani leaders with nuclear devastation when 
they already think they are facing the same outcome via conventional means 
might not deter Pakistan from using its tactical nuclear weapons.”121 It is not 
obvious how India’s pursuit of escalation dominance through limited nuclear 
options would avoid this problem, especially insofar as asymmetry in first-use 
provisions of each side’s doctrines precludes agreement between the parties on 
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mutual nuclear restraint. Responding to this dilemma in a 2014 interview, one 
former senior Indian official concluded, “There is an air of unreality in think-
ing about limited nuclear war, which is why it is dangerous to think that this 
is feasible. You can’t make escalation rational—it requires perfect knowledge, 
perfect communications, et cetera.”122
Fortunately, there has yet to be a confrontation in South Asia that has seri-
ously tested the mutual restraint that has facilitated escalation control. But 
crisis simulations involving Indian and Pakistani military officials demonstrate 
the significant escalatory pressures that could arise in a conflict. The conveners 
of a March 2013 simulation, for instance, found that 
what began as a limited war escalated quickly to a full-scale war. . . . Military 
necessity on both sides led to extensive mobilizations and horizontal escala-
tion. By the end of the third move, Pakistan was preparing to release warheads 
to its Strategic Forces Commands, readying nuclear missile launchers for pos-
sible battlefield deployment, and conducting nuclear signaling through missile 
tests and public statements. The exercise concluded at this point when neither 
side was able to terminate the war on its terms.123 
Indian strategists acknowledge the concerns about escalation and war ter-
mination that were brought out in these simulated crises. Retired Admiral 
Vijay Shankar, former commander of Indian strategic forces, asserts that “the 
distinct absence of escalatory control negates any notional gains that limited 
nuclear options bestow.”124 Verghese Koithara similarly concludes that “the 
possibility of deterrence failure can never be wholly discounted. . . . The logic 
of escalation, which makes each country want to shift the context to a more 
advantageous plane, could eventually push the contestants over the nuclear 
brink. This is the reason why a nuclear strategy must necessarily deal with the 
issues of war termination and post-war management.”125
Conclusion
The advent of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan has reinforced 
India’s tradition of restraint in the conduct of warfare. Understandable frustra-
tion over the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament and then the 2008 attack 
in Mumbai has prompted many in the Indian security establishment to seek 
new options and capabilities to punish and compel Pakistan through robust 
conventional military retaliation to future terrorist attacks. To make conven-
tional retaliation to terrorism credible, however, requires overcoming the risks 
that Pakistan would initiate the use of nuclear weapons to deter and/or defeat 
effective Indian conventional operations. A singularly experienced policymaker 
and adviser in New Delhi put the challenge this way in a 2014 interview: “Our 
nuclear situation is still ambiguous, seventeen years after the tests. We don’t have 
strategic doctrine of any kind. But twice we came close to wider wars with esca-
latory potential—in 1999 and 2001–2002. If you are going to have the bomb, 
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it imposes upon you a duty to say how you will manage the clear and present 
danger of conflict escalating to when you might be faced with using it.”126 This 
paper highlights the numerous challenges that inhere in this objective. 
India’s current nuclear doctrine and posture are fundamentally sufficient as 
long as Indian leaders do not authorize the Indian Army to make major thrusts 
into Pakistani territory or the air force to conduct major missile or bombing 
missions against the Pakistani heartland in response to a terrorist attack. With 
this premise it is reasonable to conclude that Pakistan will have no occasion 
to use nuclear weapons against India. India’s current pos-
ture of massive retaliation is sufficient to deter Pakistan 
from initiating major conventional warfare on Indian ter-
ritory and from conducting large-scale nuclear attacks on 
the Indian homeland, as long as India’s nuclear forces and 
command and control can survive a Pakistani nuclear first 
strike. Yet, its effectiveness in deterring subconventional 
proxy attacks is unconvincing. 
If, however, Indian leaders want to promote policies and 
capabilities to conduct robust conventional military opera-
tions on Pakistani territory, then India may need to increase its capabilities and 
plans to conduct limited nuclear operations against Pakistani conventional and 
military forces. Indian leaders would need to resolve the disjuncture between 
a limited offensive conventional military doctrine and a defensive nuclear doc-
trine in order to prepare for the probability that conventional warfare esca-
lates to nuclear use. Ballistic missile defenses that were tested to the point of 
being extremely reliable in realistic conditions could help obviate this require-
ment, but the experiences of the United States and others should raise doubts 
that India could successfully and affordably deploy such defenses against the 
growing array of delivery systems Pakistan is acquiring. Similarly, India could 
seek to employ a limited-nuclear-options strategy as a way to achieve escala-
tion dominance, but there is no basis for confidence that it would attain this 
objective any better than India’s existing capability. Parsimonious arguments 
for limited nuclear options simply do not stand up to the very challenging 
doctrinal, force policy, and capability questions that follow.
Despite this assessment, if India does decide to move toward development 
of limited nuclear counterforce options, it is imperative to avoid two mistakes 
that have been common in past Indian policy and practice. The first is to make 
premature announcements of capability. There is an unfortunate tendency in 
India, verging on standard operating procedure, to announce or publicly dis-
cuss operational concepts or weapons systems before they actually exist. This 
was arguably the case with the ill-fated Cold Start doctrine, and is true of 
many of the strategic capabilities tested and touted by the DRDO. Whatever 
changes India does or does not make to its nuclear policy and capabilities in 
the years ahead, including pursuing limited nuclear options, it should seek to 
avoid this strategic mistake. Premature assertion of capabilities and plans only 
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serves to feed Pakistan’s worst-case analysis and results in countervailing capa-
bilities that further disadvantage India. In the intervening period before pos-
sible development and military induction of tactical nuclear weapons—which 
would necessarily be many years—the Indian government would do well to 
avoid doing or saying things that give the impression it has either the capability 
or the intent to use limited nuclear options.
The second mistake is to default to half measures. It is entirely plausible, 
based on the history of other states with nuclear weapons, that the DRDO 
might develop a nuclear version of the Prahaar that would be delivered to the 
military before there is any attendant process for working through the circum-
stances under which the system might be used and what it would mean for 
escalation control. Many Pakistani analysts believe the Prahaar is intended to 
be just such a system, and the appearance of a nuclear Prahaar on the battle-
field could exacerbate the use-or-lose tension and command-and-control vul-
nerabilities in ways that increase the potential for accidents, miscalculation, 
and inadvertent escalation. In many ways, this situation could be more dan-
gerous for India than a formal decision to patiently adapt force posture and 
capabilities in parallel.
Regarding India’s debate on nuclear doctrine, a threat of punitive retalia-
tion may be more credible than massive retaliation, though it does not obvi-
ate questions of proportionality and escalation control. The picture may be a 
bit clearer regarding India’s no-first-use policy, which is very much integral 
to India’s image as a responsible nuclear state. Even with a change of view on 
limited nuclear options and the acquisition of more versatile weapon systems, 
India faces no need to use nuclear weapons first. To declare otherwise would 
sacrifice many of the political, moral, and strategic advantages India has gained 
by sustaining no first use. It is worth noting that China, despite the interna-
tional community’s concerns about change in its nuclear doctrine, continues 
to retain a no-first-use policy, and India presumably would 
not want to attenuate that. 
Contemporary U.S. discussions about the deterrent 
value of new nuclear capabilities underscore that this 
problem is not exclusive to India. Advocates in the United 
States of a new, nuclear-capable cruise missile assert that it 
will counter evolving Russian and Chinese capabilities and 
provide necessary flexibility to threaten or execute limited 
nuclear strikes.127 Opponents, including former secretary 
of defense William Perry and former assistant secretary of 
defense Andy Weber, argue that the weapon will be inherently destabilizing 
and, more fundamentally, that it will be a “grave mistake” to engage in tactical 
nuclear warfare.128 As in India, perceptions vary widely as to the value of tacti-
cal nuclear weapons for achieving escalation dominance. However, it is notable 
that well-respected officials such as Perry and Weber emphasize the escalatory 
risks of deploying and, potentially, employing such capabilities. 
India may adjust its nuclear policy as its 
capabilities evolve and the deterrence 
environment changes, but the answers to 
India’s strategic challenge from Pakistan 
are unlikely to be found at this level.
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Though there may be reasons that India would adjust its nuclear policy as 
its capabilities evolve and the deterrence environment changes, the answers to 
India’s strategic challenge from Pakistan are unlikely to be found at this level. 
As B. S. Nagal concludes, “To prevent proxy war/sub conventional conflicts 
calls for different strategy . . . linking our nuclear policy to the balance of the 
war spectrum does not fit India’s strategic thought, it is fraught with dangers 
and misadventures.”129 Given the asymmetric stakes involved in a potential 
conflict and the divergent beliefs about nuclear weapons, a confrontation’s 
escalation to nuclear use cannot be ruled out. For, as Vijay Shankar observes, 
“Deterrence in essence is a mind game that does not brook any other logic than 
total escalation when confronted by a nuclear strike. Notions of counter force 
strikes, flexible response and limited nuclear options do not make sense in the 
face of total escalation. India’s incentive to keep below the nuclear threshold is 
as pressing as it is for Pakistan. This is deterrence at play.”130
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